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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002048152

Disciplining and screening top executives

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199

Entrepreneurial moral hazard in income insurance

Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochgürtel, Stefan - 2011

We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618

Better safe than sorry? : ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data

Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376656

A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377059

An analysis of the effects of the severance payment reform on credit to Italian SMEs

Calcagno, Riccardo; Kräussl, Roman; Monticone, Chiara - 2008

We study the effects of the reform of the system of severance payments (TFR) of Italian employees on the cost and the access to credit for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). The most direct consequence of the reform is to reduce in the long run the amount of liquid assets available to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377271

The effect of copayments on primary care utilization : results from a quasi-experiment

Jakobsson, Niklas; Svensson, Mikael - In: Applied economics 48 (2016) 37/39, pp. 3752-3762

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621165

The effects of optimism bias in teams

Wang, Jian; Zhuang, Xintian; Yang, Jun; Sheng, Jiliang - In: Applied economics 46 (2014) 31/33, pp. 3980-3994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419828

A test for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis

Mattana, Paolo; Petroni, Filippo; Rossi, Stefania - In: Applied economics 47 (2015) 4/6, pp. 319-332

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010463379