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Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2009

I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset mindful of the fact that an encroacher's valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset owner's investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner engage in a contest over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265975

Socially-tolerable discrimination

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2008

History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264357

A nested contest: Tullock meets the all-pay auction

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2012

I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289358

Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory with an application to foreign aid

Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana; Strobl, Eric - 2007

The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264128

Consumers' Complaints, the Nature of Corruption, and Social Welfare

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2013

very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a model of corruption with incomplete information in which … consumers require a government service from officials who may be corrupt. A victim of corruption can report corrupt officials to … which no one reports corruption regardless of the proportion of honest supervisors although all lower-ranking officials are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316991

Quantity-cum-Quality Contests

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2018

I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011887370

Third-party intervention in conflicts and the indirect samaritan's dilemma

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2009

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270600

The Importance of Social Status in a Rent-Seeking Society

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2024

Status-seeking exists in all societies but different societies value status differently. How does the importance of social status affect the mode of status-seeking? I consider a game in which status can be achieved through productive effort that increases wealth or through a contest in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014534323

Citations and Incentives in Academic Contests

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2019

There are several empirical studies of ex post analysis of citations in academia. There is no ex ante analysis of citations. I consider a game-theoretic model of a contest between scholars on the basis of two widely-used measures of citations (i.e., the ℎ-index and total citation count) and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141091

Sabotaging potential rivals

Amegashie, J. Atsu; Runkel, Marco - 2005

This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261299