This paper analyses a Cournot duopoly model with finitely repeated competition. Each firm is allowed to hold inventories for a period. When there are more than two periods, inventory-holdings encourage firms to take collusive actions. By holding large inventories, a firm can commit to large...

We investigate a model where two firms choose whether to acquire information on a common competitor. We find that strategic complementarity on information acquisition exists, yielding multiple equilibria. In addition, we investigate welfare implication of information acquisition. We find that...

We investigate the effects of infrastructure investments that reduce transport costs. We use a spatial model of Salop (1979). It is well known that the number of firms is excessive at free-entry equilibrium (excess entry theorem). We find that the optimal investment level exceeds the ex post...

We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state-owned public enterprise competes against a profit-maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also...