Showing 1 - 9 of 9
the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185940
the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842
We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes. With three symmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011743460
We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012889682
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539207
We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual's effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134718
-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011632264
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172104
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298366