Central banks have an incentive to monitor the fiscal position of the government for at least two reasons. First fiscal policy can constrain the implementation of monetary policy, particularly when governments call on the central bank to fund government programmes. Second, fiscal policy measures...

To reinforce the long-term sustainability of public finances, the South African National Treasury has proposed a set of fiscal guidelines informed by three principles, namely: a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, long-term debt sustainability and inter-generational equity. Owing to the sound...

This paper covers fiscal policy tools that promote sustainability and their influence on monetary policy in Russia, the Bank of Russia's role in public debt management and main features of the domestic currency public debt market. At present Russia's budgetary circumstances are quite favourable,...

Over the past decade, prudent fiscal management has served Thailand well in cushioning the impact of the global financial turbulence. However, going forward, fiscal risks which include a weakened global economic outlook, unbalanced fiscal structure and growing contingent liabilities may have...

Reserve portfolios prior to the Global Financial Crisis provided positive (low) returns for central banks or had extremely low probabilities of earning negative returns. In the wake of the crisis, expansionary monetary policy created a low yield environment at a scale that was never seen before....

Research and experimentation on central bank digital currencies continue to fuel discussion and debate. This BIS paper updates an earlier survey that asked central banks how their plans in this area are developing. The latest responses show emerging market economies reporting stronger...

The hypothetical benefits and risks of central bank digital currencies are being widely discussed. This BIS paper adds to these discussions by taking stock of how progress and plans in this area are developing, based on a global survey of central banks. Responses show that central banks are...