We identify and track over time the factors that make the financial system vulnerable to fire sales by constructing an index of aggregate vulnerability. The index starts increasing quickly in 2004, before most other major systemic risk measures, and triples by 2008. The fire-sale-specific...

This paper describes a set of indicators of systemic risk computed from current market prices of equity and equity index options. It displays results from a prototype version, computed daily from January 2006 to January 2013. The indicators represent a systemic risk event as the realization of...

We find that banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) create less liquidity per dollar of assets in the post-LCR period than banks not subject to the LCR, in part because LCR banks make fewer loans. However, we also find that LCR banks are more resilient, as they contribute less to...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...

We show that local central bank policies attenuate global financial cycle (GFC)'s spillovers. For identification, we exploit GFC shocks and Brazilian interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: credit, foreign credit flows to banks, and employer-employee....

Many large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) continued to pay dividends during the recent financial crisis, even as financial market conditions deteriorated, large losses accumulated, and emergency capital and liquidity were being provided by the official sector. In contrast, share repurchases...

How does the management and resolution of the current crisis compare with the response of the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, widely regarded as exemplary? We argue that, while intervention has been prompter, the measures taken so far remain less comprehensive and in-depth. In particular,...

Is there any need to “clean” up a banking system in the midst of a crisis, by closing or recapitalizing weak banks and taking bad assets off bank balance sheets, or can one wait till the crisis is over? We argue that an “overhang” of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets soon...

Money markets are fundamentally different from stock markets. Stock markets are about price discovery for the purpose of allocating risk efficiently. Money markets are about obviating the need for price discovery using over-collateralised debt to reduce the cost of lending. Yet, attempts to...

This paper investigates the effects of macroprudential policies on bank risk through a large panel of banks operating in 61 advanced and emerging market economies. There are three main findings. First, there is evidence suggesting that macroprudential tools have a significant impact on bank...