Most theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality central banks play complex, long horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these issues in a simple infinite horizon game with a novel tradeoff: higher rates deter...

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2008), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of...

This paper provides a framework for modeling the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism how financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to financial crisis. Anticipating central bank's reaction to liquidity stress...

We empirically analyze how bank lending reacts to monetary policy in the presence of global financial flows. Employing a unique and novel dataset of the funding modes and currency composition of the full population of Norwegian banks in structurally identified regressions, we show that the...

The paper models the interaction between risk taking in the financial sector and central bank policy for the case of pure illiquidity risk. It is shown that, when bad states are highly unlikely, public provision of liquidity may improve the allocation, even though it encourages more risk taking...

The paper models the interaction between risk taking in the financial sector and central bank policy for the case of pure illiquidity risk. It is shown that, when bad states are highly unlikely, public provision of liquidity may improve the allocation, even though it encourages more risk taking...