This article presents an overview of the evolution of financial supervision as emerging and relevant tool of the overall economic policy design. We concentrate our analysis on the last three decades, considering the situation in both the advanced and emerging countries and with a special eye on...

In this paper bank bailout rules and central bank independence (CBI) are determined by majority voting. The failure of a bank is socially costly, since bailouts are financed by distortionary taxation. The tax distortion can be reduced via monetization, i.e. lowering CBI; but monetization causes...

The objective of this note is to present the evolution of both the economics and the political economy of monetary policy in the last three decades – first the Great Moderation and then the Financial Crisis – as a story of two intertwined tales: on the one side the tale of how to govern...

This paper offers a positive analysis of the relationships between macro prudential policy, micro supervision and central banking, presenting two contributions. Starting from the review of the recent theoretical models, which take the issue of the central bank involvement in macro supervision,...

This paper offers a positive analysis of the relationships between central banking, macro prudential supervision and insurance, presenting three contributions. Starting from the review of the recent theoretical models, which directly or indirectly take the issue of the central bank involvement...

This paper analyzes the pillar of the modern central bank governance – independence – offering three contributions. After a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence, a principal agent model is used to design a political economy framework, which explains how the...