This paper considers a dynamic matching model with imperfectly observable worker effort. In equilibrium, the wage distribution is truncated from below by a no-shirking condition. This downward wage rigidity induces the same type of inefficient churning and contractual fragility as in Ramey and...

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product market conditions...

The paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium search model where goods are produced exclusively in the market and services are produced both in the market and within the households. We use the model to examine how unemployment and welfare are affected by labor taxes in general and sectoral...

We formulate an efficiency wage model with on-the-job search where wages depend on turnover and employers may use information on whether the searching worker is employed or unemployed as a hiring criterion. We show theoretically that ranking by employment status affects both the level and the...

The paper examines policy externalities between imperfectly competitive open economies where unemployment prevails in general equilibrium. We develop a two-country and two-sector model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage bargaining in the labor market. Policy externalities...