We use a proprietary database of individual UK capital requirements spanning 1989 to 2013 and panel regression techniques to evaluate whether the effects of capital requirements on banks' balance sheet adjustments changed after the 2008–09 financial crisis. We find that after the crisis banks...

This paper develops a dynamic model to examine the ex-ante and ex-post implications of five policy options for resolving bank failures when the authorities cannot observe the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) held by individual banks. Under asymmetric information, we show that the first-best...

This paper provides an overview of the dramatic changes in the UK banking sector over the 1989–2013 period, seen through the lens of a newly assembled database built from banks' regulatory reports. This database, which we refer to as the Historical Banking Regulatory Database (HBRD), covers...

If a bank might be too-big-to-fail, then shareholders' optimal compensation contract encourages the executive to risk-shift on to the taxpayer. Standard risk-reducing regulatory compensation rules -- deferred pay, equity-linked pay, debt-like instruments in pay -- do not fully correct for...

We use quantile regression to examine the links between competition and firm-level solvency risk for all banks and building societies in the United Kingdom between 1994 and 2013. Quantile regression provides a finer picture of the relationship (as compared with standard regression techniques)...

This paper examines the effects of competition on bank stability in the United Kingdom between 1994 and 2013. We construct several measures of competition and test the relationship between competition and bank stability. We find that, on average, competition lowers stability, but that its effect...

This paper develops a model to analyse the optimal ex-ante capital and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements, and the ex-post resolution policy of banks. Banks in our model are subject to two types of moral hazard: i) ex-ante, they have the incentive to shirk on project monitoring,...

We conducted a lab experiment with 253 participants to examine how constraints on bonus akin to bonus regulations, such as bonus cap and malus, could affect individuals' risk-taking in the presence of relative performance pay. Participants took greater risks when bonus was linked to investment...

This paper examines how the interactions between the valuation regime and solvency requirements influence investment behaviour of long-term investors with stable liabilities, such as life insurers. Under limited liability, solvency requirements based on historical cost valuation encourage...

We conducted a lab experiment to examine how bonus caps and malus affect individuals' choices of risk and effort. We find that a bonus structure that rewards individuals proportionally to realised investment returns, but does not penalise negative returns, encourages risk-taking; while a bonus...