This paper proposes a positive theory of the link between banks’ capitalisation and their liquidity-risk taking as well as the severity of fire-sale problems and liquidity crises. In the basic framework of an individual bank’s decisions, we find that banks’ incentives to hold liquidity for...

We investigate the extent to which misperceptions about the economy can become self-reinforcing and thereby contribute to time-varying macroeconomic dynamics. To do so, we build a New Keynesian model with long-horizon expectations and dynamic predictor selection. Because agents solve...

We provide conditions to allow modelling situations of asymmetric information in a tractable manner. In addition, we show a novel relationship between certain games of asymmetric information and corresponding games of symmetric information. This framework establishes links between certain games...

Large, international banking groups have sought to centralise their cross-currency liquidity management: liquidity shortages in one currency are financed using liquidity surpluses in another currency. The nature of risks to financial stability emerging from global liquidity management depends on...

I present a model of social learning over an exogenous, directed network that may be readily nested within broader macroeconomic models with dispersed information and combines the attributes that agents (a) act repeatedly and simultaneously; (b) are Bayes-rational; and (c) have strategic...

Modifying the standard New-Keynesian model to replace firms' full information and sticky prices with flexible prices and dispersed information, and imposing mild and plausible restrictions on the monetary authority's decision rule, produces the striking results that (i) there exists a unique and...

In this paper we consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation in situations when the preferences of players are almost perfectly known. More precisely, we consider a class of information perturbations where in each state of the world players know their own preferences with certainty...

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, a more informed trader could receive better pricing relative to a less informed trader in over‑the‑counter financial markets. Dealers chase informed orders to better position their future quotes and avoid winner’s curse in...

We model the unsecured overnight market in the United Kingdom as a network of relationships and examine how the structure has changed over the recent period of crisis. Using established network techniques, we find strong evidence of the existence of a core of highly connected banks alongside a...

The credit risk that an individual bank poses to the rest of the financial system depends on its size, the type of exposures it has to the real economy, and its obligations to other institutions. This paper describes a system-wide risk management approach to calibrating individual banks' capital...