The banking reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2007–08 led to an increase in UK banking regulation from almost 400,000 to over 720,000 words, and to concerns about their complexity. We define complexity in terms of the difficulty of processing linguistic units, both in isolation and...

Our paper analyses confidential letters sent from the Bank of England's Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) to banks and building societies it supervises. These letters are a ‘report card' written to firms annually, and are arguably the most important, regularly recurring written...

In 2014 the Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England, was given a new secondary objective to facilitate effective competition when it advances its primary objectives related to safety and soundness and policyholder protection. Given the concerns around conflict between competition and...

How well equipped are today's macroprudential regimes to deal with a re-run of the factors that led to the global financial crisis? We argue that a large proportion of the fall in US GDP associated with the crisis can be explained by two factors: the fragility of financial sector — represented...

Since the crisis financial regulators and supervisors have been given increased independence from political bodies. But there is no clear evidence of the benefits of these reforms on the stability of the banking sector. This paper fills that void, introducing a new dataset of reforms to...

The regulation of bank capital to improve the resilience of the financial system and, related to this aim, as a means of smoothing the credit cycle are central elements of forthcoming macroprudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply...

We use a new database on macroprudential policy actions to examine whether macroprudential regulations affect international banking flows. We find evidence that borrowing by the domestic non-bank sector from foreign banks increases after home authorities take a macroprudential capital action. We...

Scholars have long believed the governance of banking supervision to affect financial stability. Although the literature has identified at length the pros and cons of having either a central bank or a separate agency responsible for microprudential banking supervision, the advantages of having...

Banks often measure credit and interest rate risk separately and then add the two risk measures to determine their overall economic capital. This approach misses complex interactions between the two risks. We develop a framework where credit and interest rate risks are analysed jointly. We focus...

The credit risk that an individual bank poses to the rest of the financial system depends on its size, the type of exposures it has to the real economy, and its obligations to other institutions. This paper describes a system-wide risk management approach to calibrating individual banks' capital...