Using regulatory data on credit unions, this paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of credit union failure in the United Kingdom. We find that a small set of financial attributes related to capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings performance and liquidity is useful for early...

While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit too-many-to-fail problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or...

We study solvency contagion risk in the UK banking system from 2008 to 2015. We develop a model that only accounts for losses transmitted after banks default, but also for losses due to the fact that creditors revalue their exposures when probabilities of default of their counterparties change....

This paper examines the determinants of credit union failure in the United Kingdom. Using regulatory data on credit unions, we estimate several discrete-time logit models and evaluate their predictive ability at one, two and three-year time horizons. We find that a small set of financial...

We develop a new multi-curve modelling framework for the term-structure of interest rates that can generate consistent cross-country stressed scenarios allowing for significant spillover effects between economies. Modern models of the term structure of interest rates typically fail to capture...

If a bank might be too-big-to-fail, then shareholders' optimal compensation contract encourages the executive to risk-shift on to the taxpayer. Standard risk-reducing regulatory compensation rules -- deferred pay, equity-linked pay, debt-like instruments in pay -- do not fully correct for...

While the financial crisis took a large toll on the UK banking industry overall, some institutions were forced to undertake more intensive efforts to deal with the economic downturn and onset of financial difficulties. This study examines whether and how the characteristics of these institutions...

This paper develops a model to analyse the optimal ex-ante capital and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements, and the ex-post resolution policy of banks. Banks in our model are subject to two types of moral hazard: i) ex-ante, they have the incentive to shirk on project monitoring,...

International standards for banking regulation leave individual countries with discretion to determine how the separate legal entities within a banking group should be brought together for the purposes of prudential regulation and supervision. This paper documents differences in the levels of...

In this paper, we study whether and how some of the remuneration rules introduced after the Global Financial Crisis affected bankers’ compensation using a unique regulatory dataset on remuneration in six major UK banks during 2014–19. We find that for bankers most affected by limits on their...