How well equipped are today's macroprudential regimes to deal with a re-run of the factors that led to the global financial crisis? We argue that a large proportion of the fall in US GDP associated with the crisis can be explained by two factors: the fragility of financial sector — represented...

We systematically analyse how network structure and bank characteristics affect solvency distress contagion risk in interbank networks. As interbank networks become more connected and more regular in structure, the contagion risk of system-wide shocks and individual bank defaults initially...

This paper presents a forward-looking approach to measure systemic solvency risk using contingent claims analysis (CCA) as a theoretical foundation for determining an institution's default risk based on the uncertainty in its asset value relative to promised debt payments over time. Default risk...

We propose new systematic tail risk measures constructed using two different approaches. The first extends the canonical downside beta and co-moment measures, while the second is based on the sensitivity of stock returns to innovations in market crash risk. Both tail risk measures are associated...

We explore the impact of central clearing on the demand for collateral arising from variation margin calls in the derivatives market. We find that the aggregate demand for collateral is not necessarily minimal when all contracts are centrally cleared. Hence, at least in this respect, increasing...

We examine the role of macroeconomic fluctuations, asset market liquidity, and network structure in determining contagion and aggregate losses in a stylised financial system. Systemic instability is explored in a financial network comprising three distinct, but interconnected, sets of agents -...

The credit risk that an individual bank poses to the rest of the financial system depends on its size, the type of exposures it has to the real economy, and its obligations to other institutions. This paper describes a system-wide risk management approach to calibrating individual banks' capital...

An individual bank can put the whole banking system at risk if its losses in response to shocks push losses for the system as a whole above a critical threshold. We determine the contribution of banks to this systemic risk using a generalisation of the Shapley value; a concept originating in...

Systemic risk in the banking sector is usually associated with long periods of economic downturn and very large social costs. On one hand, shocks coming from correlated exposures towards the real economy may induce correlation in banks’ default probabilities thereby increasing the likelihood...

We use a DSGE model with financial frictions, leverage limits on banks, loan to value (LTV) limits and debt‑service ratio (DSR) limits on mortgage borrowing to examine: i) the effects of different macroprudential policies on key macro aggregates; ii) their interaction with each other and with...