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The theoretical argument for central bank independence is based on the idea that even if the government represents people's preferences over inflation and output it has an incentive to renege from prearranged plans to gain a short run boost to output. This incentive leads to higher than desired...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245805
The implications of uncertain policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approaches to monetary policy are investigated. It is shown that, in the presence of uncertain preferences, a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh performs better than an explicit inflation target as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435696
This paper extends the Svensson inflation forecast targeting framework with a convex Phillips curve. An asymmetric target rule is derived, which implies a higher level of nominal interest rates than the Svensson forward-looking version of the reaction function popularised by Taylor. Extending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357341
There is a considerable academic literature on the relationship between Central Bank independence and inflation but the issue of Central Bank accountability and its effect of inflation performance has received very little attention. This paper looks at the issue of accountability in a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005737893