This paper builds a model with imperfect competition in the banking sector. In the model, banks issue deposits and make loans, and deposits can be used as payment instruments by households. We use the model to assess the general equilibrium effects of introducing a central bank digital currency...

To what extent does a central bank digital currency (CBDC) compete with bank deposits? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a structural model where each household chooses which financial institution to deposit their digital money with. Households value the interest paid on digital...

This paper investigates how the introduction of an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) that serves as a perfect substitute for bank deposits as an electronic means of payment affects monetary policy pass-through. When the deposit market is not fully competitive, the CBDC tends...

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and...