We study the effect of collateral eligibility of corporate loans on the pricing of these loans by banks in Finland. Speciftcally, we investigate whether loans that are pledgeable as collateral for central bank borrowing have lower liquidity premia and thus lower interest rates. For...

We study public funding of banks and non-financial firms in a time of crisis. We find that bank capitalization is more effective in stabilizing the economy than direct funding to firms, but it also creates larger distortions. We show that the optimal, social-welfare-maximizing, structure of a...

Over 2010-2016, municipal debt in Germany crowded out private investment worth 1 percent of GDP. Forced to lend to municipalities by their statutes, local public banks compensated for declining municipal-debt yields by charging higher rates to firms in Germany's locally segmented credit markets....

We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets...

We study the impact of disclosure about bank fundamentals on depositors' behavior in the presence (and absence) of economic linkages between financial institutions. Using a controlled laboratory environment, we identify under which conditions disclosure is conducive to bank stability. We find...

Extending a standard credit-risk model illustrates that a single factor can drive both expected losses and the extent to which they may be exceeded in extreme scenarios, ie "unexpected losses." This leads us to develop a framework for forecasting these losses jointly. In an application to...

An asset is money-like if investors have no incentives to acquire costly private information on the underlying collateral. However, privately provided money-like assets-like prime money market fund (MMF) shares-are prone to runs if investors suddenly start to question the value of the...

We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banksíassets quality. In our model the precision of information a§ects banksí cost of raising funding and asset proÖle riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banksístability and social surplus are...

A parsimonious extension of a well-known portfolio credit-risk model allows us to study a salient stylized fact - abrupt switches between high- and low-loss phases - from a risk-management perspective. As uncertainty about phase switches increases, expected losses decouple from unexpected...

We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to choose risky assets so as to promise...