We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable ’salary’...

This study finds that a model with internal habit memory allowsto simultaneously explain a series of business cycle and asset pricing puzzles. Compared to the literature, the equity premium puzzle can be resolved in a model with endogenous labor, without giving rise to excessive risk free rate...

This paper studies how the investors’ attitude towards earnings surprises affects the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings in an intertemporal context, where the consensus forecast of the analysts is not exogenously given but determined by the strategic interaction between the analysts...

The main contribution of this work is to provide a dynamic general equilibrium model of asset allocation, allowing to reconcile economic theory with several puzzling contradictions recently pointed out in the literature: (i) the asset allocation puzzle, (ii) the observed time-variation in...