This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makesinvestors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance...

We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable ’salary’...

This study finds that a model with internal habit memory allowsto simultaneously explain a series of business cycle and asset pricing puzzles. Compared to the literature, the equity premium puzzle can be resolved in a model with endogenous labor, without giving rise to excessive risk free rate...

The main contribution of this work is to provide a dynamic general equilibrium model of asset allocation, allowing to reconcile economic theory with several puzzling contradictions recently pointed out in the literature: (i) the asset allocation puzzle, (ii) the observed time-variation in...