The liquidity of financial system plays a central role in systemic crises. In this paper, we show that the ECB haircut policies provided an important liquidity support to distressed financial institutions during the euro area sovereign debt turmoil. Using novel, micro data on the pool of...

We measure the relative role of sovereign-dependence risk and balance sheet (credit) risk in euro area interbank market fragmentation from 2011 to 2015. We combine bank-to-bank loan data with detailed supervisory information on banks' cross-border and cross-sector exposures. We study the impact...

This paper analyses the exposure to climate risk of ABS, an asset class frequently pledged as collateral in the European Central Bank (ECB) refinancing operations. This paper focuses on ABS backed by auto loans or loans granted to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and explores ways to measure...

In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard, with optimal contracting between a competitive investor and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian contagion. We provide here a comprehensive mathematical formulation of the...

We investigate the consequences of banks' liquidity hoarding behavior for the stability of the financial system proposing a new model of banking contagion through two channels, bilateral exposures and funding shortage. Inspired by the key role of liquidity hoarding in the 2007-2009 financial...

This paper investigates the impact of bank competition in Sub-Saharan Africa on bank non-performing loans, a measure of credit risk. Using bank-level data for a sample of 221 banks from 33 countries over the period 2000-15, we find a non-linear or U-shaped relationship between bank competition...

Based on a unique data set referencing exposures on single name credit default swaps (CDS) on European reference entities, we study the structure and the topology of the European CDS market and its evolution from 2008 to 2012, resorting to network analysis. The structural features revealed show...

This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By...

We use hikes in the countercyclical capital buffer [CCyB] to measure how tighter bank capital requirements affect their solvency and value, according to market participants. Two features of the CCyB in Europe allow for a unique identification strategy of the effect of such requirements. First,...

When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes...