The threat of overthrow stabilizes a constitution because it disciplines the elites. This is the main rationale behind rights to resistance. In this paper, we test this conjecture experimentally. We model a society in which players can produce wealth by solving a coordination problem....

Die vorliegende Studie skizziert zunächst die Bedeutung von Wirtschaftskriminalität aus Sicht der deutschen Unternehmen sowie den derzeitigen Forschungsstand zu den Ursachen von Wirtschaftskriminalität. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Motive von Wirtschaftsstraftätern noch nicht hinreichend...

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. In a framework in which potential criminals can choose between different crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead...

Die vorliegende Studie skizziert zunächst die Bedeutung von Wirtschaftskriminalität aus Sicht der deutschen Unternehmen sowie den derzeitigen Forschungsstand zu den Ursachen von Wirtschaftskriminalität. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Motive von Wirtschaftsstraftätern noch nicht hinreichend...

This paper analyzes a contest in which defenders move first, have private information about the value of the objects they are trying to protect, and determine the observability of their defense efforts. The equilibrium consistent with the intuitive criterion depends on the distribution of...

We investigate how third-party punishers and potential violators decide under evidentiary uncertainty in a take game. In line with the legal requirement and in contrast to economic models, neither the sanction nor the harm level affects the punishment probability, but the quality of evidence...

Low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. The aim of our study is to provide causal evidence on the link between self-control and criminal behavior. We test whether individuals with lower self-control behave in a more antisocial manner and are less risk-averse and thus are,...