Public sector sponsored training was implemented at a large scale during the transition process in East Germany. Based on new administrative data, we estimate the differential effects of three different programs for East Germany during the transition process. We apply a dynamic multiple...

We evaluate the effects of different short-term training programs on the employment chances of immigrant and native welfare recipients in Germany. In particular, we investigate whether program effects differ between both groups and what might cause these potential differences. In a first step,...

This paper analyses the effect of training participation on employees’ retention in the training company. It for the first time empirically combines the human capital and the monopsony theory by jointly controlling for the portability, visibility, and credibility of training. Based on an...

This paper addresses the puzzle how employers that invest in general human capital can gain an information advantage with respect to the ability of their employees when training is certified by credible external institutions. We apply an established model from the employer-learning literature...

We analyse Polish active labour market policy (ALMP) training programmes from a macroeconomic (regional) point of view. The effects of training programmes on the outflows from unemployment and the effects of all ALMP programmes on the outflows from employment (to identify displacement effects)...

In what sense are institutions a deep determinant of growth? In this paper, we address this question by examining the relationship between city growth and institutional reform in 19th century Germany, when some cities experienced deep institutional reform as a result of French rule. Employing an...

In 2003, Germany moved from a system in which participants in training programs for the unemployed are assigned by caseworkers to an allocation system using vouchers. Based on the rich administrative data for all vouchers and on actual program participation, we provide inverse probability...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...