The theory of compensating differentials has proven difficult to test with observational data: the consequences of selection, unobserved firm and worker characteristics, and the broader macroeconomic environment complicate most analyses. Instead, we construct experimental, real-effort labor...

While survey data supports a strong relationship between personality and labor market outcomes, the exact mechanisms behind this association remain unexplored. In this paper, we take advantage of a controlled laboratory set-up to test whether this relationship operates through productivity, and...

To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount...

We use a novel method to elicit and measure higher order risk preferences (prudence and temperance) in an experiment with 658 adolescents. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that higher order risk preferences - particularly prudence - are strongly related to adolescents' field...

We use a novel method to elicit and measure higher order risk preferences (prudence and temperance) in an experiment with 658 adolescents. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that higher order risk preferences particularly prudence are strongly related to adolescents' field behavior,...

We apply the basic lessons and insights learned in the elicitation and estimation of risk and time preferences literature to the literature on social preferences. Following Andersen et al. (2008), we design a laboratory experiment to jointly elicit risk preferences and preferences for altruism....

Our experiment investigates managers’ self-predictions of their subsequent performance and, based upon, their choice of a collaborator. Our results show that managers’ self-predictions are not biased anymore after they are informed about the performance of a reference group. In spite of...

In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...

Our experiment investigates managers’ self-predictions of their subsequent performance and, based upon, their choice of a collaborator. Our results show that managers’ self-predictions are not biased anymore after they are informed about the performance of a reference group. In spite of...

Employers use applicant signals to help solve an asymmetric information problem in organizations. In this paper, we examine the impact of validated Dark versus Light personality traits on incentivized behaviors important to organizations: task effort, honesty, and reciprocity. A second study...