Showing 1 - 10 of 13
to elicit the agent's private information. We establish this result by using the properties of signalling game. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263060
than purely self-interested agents for a given prize structure. Contrary to standard tournament theory first-best efforts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263076
The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263079
Numerous laboratory experiments show that workers reciprocate to high wages with high effort, when there is perfect information on the surplus created. Recent field experiments, however, suggest that trust and reciprocity may be lower or absent when the information is incomplete. We report a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263092
We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263101
Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263107
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263117
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team (“black sheep”) exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a “wall of silence”). Much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263140
If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to the contract, Article 2 of the UCC as well as European warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer resorts to "opportunistic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263188