We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring ambiguous priors. First, we find that in equilibrium, S typically mixes between messages triggering different behavior by R while R himself mixes after some message. Technically, the mixing performed by S is...

We study relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers. We present an example in which stochastic mechanisms perform strictly better than deterministic ones and can implement any outcome arbitrarily...

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players...

Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players...

Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...

We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy...

We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an...