Showing 1 - 10 of 141
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and … Rustichini, 1998). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals …, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263088
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2005) introduced a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276583
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define … restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276586
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define … restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968356
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2005) introduced a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968416
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and … Rustichini, 1998). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals …, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968454
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264924
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276585
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968465
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276584