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Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility

Mitra, Manipushpak; Gautier, Axel - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263090

Gains from second-order approximations

Paustian, Matthias - 2003

The benefit from using second-order approximations tostochastic dynamic rational expec- tations models is explained. By example of the neoclassical growth model, this note as- sesses the accuracy of the obtained approximation. The implications for optimal policy are discussed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263093

Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly

Dubey, Pradeep; Sondermann, Dieter - 2003

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263094

Hildenbrand Distribution Economies as Limiting Empirical Distributions of Random Economies

Hohnisch, Martin - 2003

The present note shows that the concept of a distribution economy (Hildenbrand (1974)) is closely related to a framework of an exchange economy in which the agents’ individual characteristics (i.e. preferences and endowments) are random (Hildenbrand (1971), Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1973),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263096

Optimal Dynamic Choice of Durable and Perishable Goods

Bank, Peter; Riedel, Frank - 2003

We analyze the life cycle consumption choice model for multiple goods, focusing on the distinction between durables and perishables. As an approximation of the fact that rather high transaction costs and market imperfections prevail in markets for used durables, we assume that investment in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263097

Efficient partnership dissolution under buy/sell clauses

de Frutos, Maria Angeles; Kittsteiner, Thomas - 2004

When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263098

Law and Economics of Obligations

Schweizer, Urs - 2004

While various liability rules of tort law provide efficient incentives to invest, breach remedies of contract law are claimed to be distortive. Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules for both contractual and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puzzling. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263099

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts

Köhler, Wolfgang R. - 2004

This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and revelation. A decision maker faces the … problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … their recommendation is confirmed can be explained by incomplete information about the expert's cost to increase the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263103

Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability

Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263105

Party Platforms in Electoral Competition with many constituencies

Kittsteiner, Thomas; Eyster, Eric - 2004

This paper uses the Hotelling-Downs spatial model of electoral competition between candidates to explore competition between political parties. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters candidates from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263106