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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2013
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … that situation, the importance of cooperative behavior between the firm's divisions determines whether decentralization or … cross-authority delegation is the optimal form of full delegation. If, however, the division heads are more efficient than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617907
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … that situation, the importance of cooperative behavior between the firm's divisions determines whether decentralization or … cross-authority delegation is the optimal form of full delegation. If, however, the division heads are more efficient than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312979
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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract
Roider, Andreas - 2003
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing … conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263062
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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract
Roider, Andreas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing … conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968390
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Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Schipper, Burkhard C.; Raab, Philippe - 2004
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263110
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Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Raab, Philippe; Schipper, Burkhard C. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968365
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Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri- cal puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264917
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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263163
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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? -- On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968412
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Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction
Roider, Andreas - 2002
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating …-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263049