We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...

We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...

The present note shows that the concept of a distribution economy (Hildenbrand (1974)) is closely related to a framework of an exchange economy in which the agents’ individual characteristics (i.e. preferences and endowments) are random (Hildenbrand (1971), Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1973),...

In the context of standard two-period pure-exchange economies with sequential trade, this paper proposes a decentralized coordination mechanism for equilibriumexpectations, facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions are modelled stochastically by specifying a family of...

The present note shows that the concept of a distribution economy (Hildenbrand (1974)) is closely related to a framework of an exchange economy in which the agents’ individual characteristics (i.e. preferences and endowments) are random (Hildenbrand (1971), Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1973),...

In the context of standard two-period pure-exchange economies with sequential trade, this paper proposes a decentralized coordination mechanism for equilibriumexpectations, facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions are modelled stochastically by specifying a family of...

This paper describes a method for solving a class of forward-looking Markov-switching Rational Expectations models under noisy measurement, by specifying the unobservable expectations component as a general-measurable function of the observable states of the system, to be determined optimally...

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research, social learning, and related fields. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a population game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers'...

We analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is determined by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we...