learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be …

?uence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment … possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules … a close connection to the original proxy auction exists. …

We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private … bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as … overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We …

This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction … experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual …

Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own …

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction …