Showing 1 - 10 of 143
Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263057
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263094
When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263098
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263167
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264920
Everyone remembers a plot where a disadvantaged individual facing the prospect of failure, spends more effort, turns around the game and wins unexpectedly. Most tournament theories, however, predict the opposite pattern and see the disadvantaged agent investing less effort. We show that ’turn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434944
Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312970
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989637
When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968343
Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968447