This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is … with delegation, is valuable for the principal if she retains control over the second decision. Hence, this paper provides … a new rational for partial delegation: a transfer of control to the better-informed party can be used by the supervisor …

conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We … consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …

delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the …

conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We … consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is … with delegation, is valuable for the principal if she retains control over the second decision. Hence, this paper provides … a new rational for partial delegation: a transfer of control to the better-informed party can be used by the supervisor …

delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the …

used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is …

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …