Showing 1 - 10 of 214
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317663
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032208
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264916
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264925
property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second … multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights theory that are empirically testable. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263049
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263051
This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The originality of the paper is to consider that the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263052
Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263053
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263061