Showing 1 - 10 of 27
This paper studies the role of exchange policies as a price discrimination device in a sequential screening model with heterogeneous goods. In the first period, agents are uncertain about their ordinal preferences over a set of horizontally differentiated goods, but have private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430431
The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The main result shows that in contrast to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014482789
This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation over time. In principle, a refund mechanism can specify the odds that the seller requires the product returned while issuing a (partial) refund, which we call stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493000
In markets for credence goods – such as health care or repair services – fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts’ provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382483
Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382489
We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135462
We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125582
It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other bidders’ valuations. Nevertheless, an informative public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124829
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782278
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782288