This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

We consider how the amount of the technology transferred and the characteristics of the partneraffect licensing. We find that a partial technology transfer can be the joint-profit minimizingtransfer, though under weakly concave demand, a complete transfer always increases joint profitif there...

Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneouswhen consumers are divisible in Berglas’s (1976) anonymouscrowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible or ifclubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs areefficient. In such a model, we...