Mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the...

Building on the sequential identification result of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019), this paper develops estimation and inference procedures for static games of incomplete information with payoff‐relevant unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria. With payoff‐relevant unobserved...

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information‐sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When any two agents in the network are connected either...

Strategic interaction parameters characterize the impact of actions of one economic agent on the payoff of another economic agent, and are of great interest in both theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, by considering econometric models involving simultaneous discrete systems of...

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically...

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...

We study a simultaneous, complete-information game played by p = 1 P agents. Each p has an ordinal decision variable Y p ∈ A p ={ 0 1 M p} , where M p can be unbounded, A p is p’s action space, and each element in A p is an action , that is, a potential value for Y p . The collective action...

We develop a minimum distance estimator for dynamic games of incomplete information. We take a two-step approach, following Hotz and Miller (1993), based on the pseudo-model that does not solve the dynamic equilibrium so as to circumvent the potential indeterminacy issues associated with...

This paper develops a strategy for identification and estimation of complete information games that does not require a regressor that has large support or a parametric specification for the distribution of the unobservables. The identification result uses a nonstandard but plausible condition on...

We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that pay- off functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each...