Rabin proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to almost all non-expected...

A reasonable level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. This was demonstrated by Rabin for expected utility theory. Later, Safra and Segal extended this result by showing that similar arguments apply to...

Rabin proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to almost all non-expected...

This note shows that Machina's (1982) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Frâ„chet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies,...

Experimental evidence suggests that individuals who face an asymmetric distribution over the likelihood of a specific event might actually prefer not to know the exact value of this probability. We address these findings by studying a decision maker who has recursive, non-expected utility...

Since Becker (1971), a common argument against asymmetric norms that promote minority rights over those of the majority is that such policies reduce total welfare. While this may be the case, we show that there are simple environments where aggregate sum of individual utilities is actually...

Machina (2009, 2012) lists a number of situations where standard models of ambiguity aversion are unable to capture plausible features of ambiguity attitudes. Most of these problems arise in choice over prospects involving three or more outcomes. We show that the recursive non-expected utility...

Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the decision maker. We show that when the choice set consists of pairwise statistically independent lotteries, transitive regret-based behavior is consistent with betweenness preferences and with a family of...

Transitivity is a fundamental axiom in Economics that appears in consumer theory, decision under uncertainty, and social choice theory. While the appeal of transitivity is obvious, observed choices sometimes contradict it. This paper shows that treatments of violations of transitivity al- ready...