We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive results from the Shapley-Scarf economy do not carry over to this model, even if agents' preferences are strict and can be represented by...

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

We consider how the amount of the technology transferred and the characteristics of the partneraffect licensing. We find that a partial technology transfer can be the joint-profit minimizingtransfer, though under weakly concave demand, a complete transfer always increases joint profitif there...

Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneouswhen consumers are divisible in Berglas’s (1976) anonymouscrowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible or ifclubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs areefficient. In such a model, we...

We consider the optimal pricing and referral strategy of a monopoly that uses a simple consumer communication network (a chain) to spread product information. The first-best policy with fully discriminatory position-based referral fees involves standard monopoly pricing and referral fees that...

In the 1950s and 60s, Japanese and US antitrust authorities occassionally used the degree of concentration to regulate industries. Does regulating firms based on their market shares make theoretical sense? We set up a simple duopoly model with stochastic R&D activities to evaluate market share...

We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the...

Housing developments (condos and suburban developments) are not necessarily homogeneous. Developers provide different types of units with various sizes and other characteristics catering to different types of customers. In this paper, we allow local consumption externalities within each...

We consider a public good provision game with voluntary participation. Agents participating in the game provide a public good and pay the fees according to a mechanism (allocation rule), while nonparticipants can free-ride on the participants. We examine how the equilibrium public good provision...

Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) show that production efficiency is achieved under the optimal commodity tax when profit income is zero. Here, we consider the simplest possible model to analyze production efficiency in the presence of profit income: a tax reform...