We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family … labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra …-household allocation can be recovered from observations on marriage decisions. Introducing the marriage market in the collective model …

Why do some men father children outside of marriage but not provide support? Why are some single women willing to have … children outside of marriage when they receive little or no support from unmarried fathers? Why is this behavior especially … common among blacks? To shed light on these questions, we develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage …

Two thirds of all Indian women have migrated for marriage, around 300 million women, but little is known about this … its causes. Contrary to conventional wisdom, marriage migration does not contribute to risk sharing. Nor is it driven by …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a …

match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We extend the celebrated Gallai …

mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes involving matching …