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We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325007
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325152
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866662
have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to …We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version … transitions ; democracy ; autocracy ; IMF ; World Bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009629705
the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory. -- IMF conditionality ; delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003908576
An endogenous growth model on finance and growth is formulated, and empirical analyses are conducted. The model exhibits structural shifts and breaks caused by institutional changes, suggesting that a linear approach is inadequate. To address this point empirically, we fit data for 90 countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001767757
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003837665
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608842
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312539
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881494