Showing 1 - 10 of 92
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687048
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
In this paper, I provide a characterization of a \textit{set} of probability measures with which a prior ``weakly merges.'' In this regard, I introduce the concept of ``conditioning rules'' that represent the \textit{regularities% } of probability measures and define the ``eventual generation''...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673400
We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308721
I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is privately known and evolves according to a Markov process. Under certain assumptions, patient players can attain approximately efficient payoffs in equilibrium. The public signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744031
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673541
This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674064
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309585
We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents only observe the aggregate distribution of payoffs and only recall information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020295
We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022777