. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non …-pay auction and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the … anomaly. First, participation in the all-pay auction is substantially lower than in the other mechanisms while the average …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions and bidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has a …

approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

, afterwards, subjects take part in a second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the act of payoff reduction …