We model the interaction between capitalists and entrepreneurs as a dynamic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are distinguished. The purpose is to answer some questions that have arisen in the development of profit-led versus wage-led growth models. We...

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents...

We examine solutions in which neither player is worse off from the leadership of one in a policy maker-public game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. Outcome space is dotted with equivalence classes of solutions. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) results and their New...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to appraise the transition from bank-based systems to universal banking. Design/methodology/approach – The Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps macroeconomic framework is used to structure the argument. Findings – It is shown that the activity of...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to appraise the transition from bank‐based systems to universal banking. Design/methodology/approach – The Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps macroeconomic framework is used to structure the argument. Findings – It is shown that the activity of...