We present an empirical study of voting behavior to analyze the impact of opportunism; that is, whenever political incumbents implement economic policies strategically and in connection with general elections in order to gain votes. We derive a measure for opportunism that is isolated from the...

We generate a time-series of relative preferences of policy makers for inflation stability using a sample of 24 countries in order to study the behavior of political parties. Such behavior is essential in both the partisan cycle models and the opportunistic political cycle analysis. Our evidence...

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to "vote out" a corrupt incumbent than to re-elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the...

We study how important monetary, exchange-rate, and fiscal arrangements are in determining the relative preferences of policy makers for inflation stability. We argue that focusing on policy intentions, represented by these preferences, constitutes a better way of evaluating policy behavior,...

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of large energy subsidies in a small open economy. The model includes domestic energy production and consumption, trade in energy at world market prices, as well as private and public sector production. The model is...

We formulate an overlapping generations model with skill heterogeneity and productive and non-productive government programs to study the macroeconomic and intergenerational welfare effects caused by risk premium shocks and government debt reductions. We demonstrate that in a small open economy...