We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, `disciplines' governments and improves gov- ernance. We demonstrate that globalization a ects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital ight. This increased threat of capital ight can discipline governments and...

We use detailed contract level data on a portfolio of 197 co¤ee washing sta- tions in 18 countries to identify the sources and consequences of credit markets imperfections. Due to moral hazard, default rates increase following unanticipated increases in world co¤ee prices just before (but not...

This paper examines the role of cultural factors in driving the politics, size and nature (tempo- rary versus permanent migration) of migration policy. We show that there exists a broad political failure that results in ine¢ ciently high barriers restricting the import of temporary foreign...

Why are some leaders able to rally mass support and successfully catalyze revolutionary change while others fail? We argue that the key to understanding a leader’s effectiveness lies in dissecting the symbiotic relationship between the leader and his committed activist-followers. Good leaders...

This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms in developing countries. First, we demonstrate that economic reforms that are proceeding successfully may run into a political impasse, with the reform’s initial success having a negative impact...