Expanded public availability of U.S. banking data has prompted a need to reexamine end-of-quarter window dressing. We find substantial heterogeneity in the pattern of window dressing across banks and products, not all of which can be explained as customerinitiated, and some of which is...

As bidders reach capacity throughout a sequential common value auction, theory predicts they will account for the option value of purchasing later units against fewer rivals. Mergers, joint purchasing arrangements, or a common bidding agent may result in a capacity advantaged bidder. Using...

This paper investigates the market reaction to a firm switching from a male CEO to a female CEO. We compare these firms against a four dimensional matched sample of male to male CEO appointments. Our results indicate that female CEO appointments are followed by small insignificant negative...

Contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year. This paper characterizes equilibrium effort, both individual and aggregate, in a general parameterization of such repeated contests.

This study provides new evidence regarding reciprocal brokered deposits (RBDs), regulatory responses, and bank risk, contributing to prior studies in four ways. First, using updated financial Call Report data and bank failure data through 2012, we reexamine the moral hazard hypothesis that banks...

This paper demonstrates that exaggerated risk aversion may comprise a rational form of strategic behavior in the face of asymmetric information. Unlike some other forms of strategic behavior analyzed previously, this behavior confers a benefit in the form of higher ex post consumption (not...

This paper tests the random walk hypothesis and weak form market efficiency in the VIX futures market using a variety of tests. A unit root in the aggregated market price series suggests that the VIX futures market is efficient. For the individual VIX futures price series, 51 of 54 futures...

Contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year. This paper characterizes equilibrium effort, both individual and aggregate, in a general parameterization of such repeated contests.

Several theories of externalities and asymmetric information suggest a positive role for government programs to assist credit markets, though potential distortions by special interests carry attendant dangers. We examine the empirical association between funding by several federal government...