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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
Bhaskar, V. - 2012
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098365
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A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654
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The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
Kajii, Atsushi; Morris, Stephen - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000927288
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Contagion
Morris, Stephen - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000958006
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Interaction games : a unified analysis of incomplete information, local interaction and random matching
Morris, Stephen - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000958007
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Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring : notes on a coordination perspective
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000990744
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Acceptance games and protocols
Morris, Stephen - 1992 - Rev. version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000843723