This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ...

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative,...

This report provides estimates of the VAT Gap for 26 EU Member States for 2013, as well as revised estimates for the period 2009-2012. It is a follow-up to the report “Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member Statess, published in September 2013 (hereafter: 2013 Report),...

This report provides estimates of the VAT Gap for 26 EU Member States for 2012, as well as revised estimates for the period 2009-2011. It is a follow-up to the report "Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States", published in September 2013. This update incorporates the...

This report presents and discusses the findings of the "Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States", conducted by CASE and CPB. The main aim of the study was to help better understand the recent trends in the field of VAT fraud and analyse determinants of VAT Gaps using...

Tax evasion is typically analyzed in a principal/agent framework,the government (principal) trying to provide agents with the incentives to pay their taxes. However, evading sales, excise or trade taxes requires the cooperation of at least two taxpayers. When individuals evade taxes, they face...