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Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - 2012

very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618920

Divisible-good uniform price auctions : the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - 2009

We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. 'Standard' and 'uniform' allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a 'hybrid' rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003898823

Communication, leadership and coordination failure

Dong, Lu; Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2015

Using experimental methods, this paper investigates the limits of communication and leadership in aiding group coordination in a minimum effort game. Choosing the highest effort is the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium in this game, and communication and leadership are expected to help in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318403

Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - 2013 - [Revised version of 2012-12], This version: 27 February 2013

deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and … additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback … overall excess expenditures are similar to the stochastic contest with own feedback. -- contests ; rent-seeking ; information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009710596

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526

Preventive wars

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2022

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942

Through Trial & Error to Collusion

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575