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Gift exchange and workers' fairness concerns : when equality is unfair

Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - 2009

We study how different payment modes inuence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854042

On the survival of payoff maximizing behavior and delegation in contests

Possajennikov, Alexandre (contributor) - 2008

depends on the slope of the reaction function being zero at equilibrium. The application of this result to contests confirms … that in two-player contests the optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize principal's payoff … while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from principal's payoff maximization. Further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790694

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game

Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2012

We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578200

Promoting cooperation : the distribution of reward and punishment power

Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012

Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578208

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game

Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2014 - This version: 02 April 2014

We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340303

Inducing good behavior: bonuses versus fines in inspection games

Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2010

We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an "inspection game" where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933797

Signaling without common prior : an experiment

Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, … - 2009

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003828280

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526

Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2003

Using insights from the theory of projective geometry one can prove convergence of continuous fictitious play in a certain class of games. As a corollary, we obtain a kind of equilibrium selection result, whereby continuous fictitious play converges to a particular equilibrium contained in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062342

A general model of best response adaptation

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2003

We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062353